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ABSTRACT
During the past two decades, several public and private organizations have initiated
programs to report publicly on the quality of medical care provided by specific hospitals and
physicians.  These programs have sparked broad debate among economists and policy makers
concerning whether, and to what extent, they have improved or harmed medical productivity.  We
take advantage of a cross-sectional time series of different hospitals to address two fundamental
questions about quality reporting.  First, we examine whether report cards affect the distribution of
patients across hospitals.  Second, we determine whether report cards lead to improved medical
quality among hospitals identified as particularly bad or good performers.  Our data are from the
longest-standing effort to measure and report health care quality – the Cardiac Surgery Reporting
System (CSRS) in New York State.  Using data for 1991 through 1999, we find that CSRS affected
both the volume of cases and future quality at hospitals identified as poor performers.  Poor
performing hospitals lost relatively healthy patients to competing facilities and experienced
subsequent improvements in their performance as measured by risk-adjusted mortality.
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During the past two decades, several public and private organizations have 
initiated programs to report publicly on the quality of medical care provided by specific 
hospitals and physicians.  These programs have sparked broad debate among economists 
and policy makers.  At issue is the question of whether, and to what extent, these “report 
card” programs have improved or harmed medical productivity.  
Economists typically see more information as obviously beneficial.  How can 
patients be harmed by knowing more about the quality of their medical care providers?  
The key problem is the potential inaccuracy of quality data.  Consider an attempt to rate 
the quality of surgeons performing cardiac bypass surgery, which we examine in this 
paper.  The outcome of any bypass operation depends on physician and hospital 
characteristics and on the underlying health of the patient.  Patients who are sicker are 
more likely to have poor outcomes than those who are healthier.   
If the quality reporting system does not take these patient differences into 
account, several problems might result.  First, patients and referring physicians—many of 
whom have prior informal data about the quality of various providers—may make 
decisions based on the new data without realizing its potential inaccuracies.  Second, 
even if the patients do not rely on the new data, its existence may confuse them to the 
point that they ignore both sources of information.  Either way, it is possible that referral 
patterns might change for the worse. 
The situation could be even more problematic.  If hospitals know that their 
reputations may be penalized if they treat high-risk patients, they might reduce their 
willingness to operate on such patients, denying them potentially needed care or forcing 
them to travel to other areas.  As a result, health outcomes may suffer.   2 
These possibilities are not simply theoretical.  David Dranove et al. (2003) argued 
that quality report cards for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery in New York 
State and Pennsylvania hurt quality, by limiting access to surgery for high-risk patients.  
Similarly, Nowamagbe Omoigui et al. (1996) found that a larger percentage of high-risk 
bypass surgery patients were transferred out of New York State following the 
introduction of report cards, and Eric Schneider and Arnold Epstein (1996) found that 
many cardiac surgeons reported a decreased willingness to operate on severe patients 
after introduction of CABG report cards in Pennsylvania.  But the evidence on this issue 
is not uniform.  Edward Hannan et al. (1994) and Eric Peterson et al. (1998) found that 
the average in-hospital mortality rate for CABG surgery in New York declined 
significantly after introduction of hospital report cards.
1 
With few exceptions,
2 the above studies all examine the impact of report cards by 
considering trends at the state level.  Identification of the impact of report cards thus 
comes from average effects within states with report cards relative to average effects in 
those without such programs.  An alternate approach, and that which we employ, is to 
examine the impact of report cards on the outcomes for and allocation of patients across 
individual providers within a given state that adopted a report card system.  This allows 
more observations on quality as well as very complete data for risk adjustment. 
We take advantage of a cross-sectional time series of different hospitals to address 
two fundamental questions about quality reporting.  First, we examine whether report 
cards affect the distribution of where patients go for bypass surgery.  Second, we 
determine whether report cards lead to improved medical quality among hospitals 
identified as particularly bad or good performers.  Our data are from the longest-standing 3 
effort to measure and report health care quality – the Cardiac Surgery Reporting System 
(CSRS) in New York State. 
 
New York’s Cardiac Surgery Reporting System 
Since the late 1980s, CSRS has collected detailed information on every patient 
receiving bypass surgery at a hospital in New York State.  In addition to identifying the 
surgeon and hospital involved with the procedure, CSRS collects data on clinical 
outcomes—specifically whether or not the patient died in the hospital following the 
procedure—and incoming severity of the patient.  The severity data contains information 
on whether a given patient has a history of one or more of roughly 40 clinical conditions 
including diabetes, kidney failure, liver failure, or prior heart attack (for a detailed 
description of this clinical information, see Hannan et al., 1994).  Once every 12 to 18 
months, the state releases these data, along with information on which hospitals were 
statistically significantly better or worse than the statewide average.  These data are 
reported with a lag of several years.  For example, the data on hospitals for 1999 was 
released in September 2002. 
To adjust for underlying health risks of the patients, New York uses a logistic 
regression to predict the expected probability of in-hospital mortality.  The covariates for 
the regression are drawn from the clinical variables contained in CSRS.  We follow this 
procedure in our analysis.
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Figure 1 illustrates the 25
th percentile, median, and 75
th percentile values of risk-
adjusted mortality across all hospitals performing bypass surgery in New York in a given 
year. Risk-adjusted mortality fell significantly across the state during the first decade of 4 
the report card program.  Further, the range between the hospitals at the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles narrows during the early years of the reporting program, suggesting improved 
performance among initial poor performers.  Although these results do not compare New 
York to other states without report-card programs, they are consistent with prior findings 
that suggest an improvement in outcomes in New York during the initial years of the 
reporting. 
  To examine the impact of report cards on the allocation of patients across 
hospitals, we use the total number of CABG cases for each hospital-month as the 
dependent variable in regressions that include hospital and year fixed effects.  Our basic 
equation is of the form: 
 
(1) Casesimt =  β1(Highimt) + β2(Lowimt) + δi  + λt + εit     
 
where i denotes hospital, m denotes month of hospital admission (for years 1991 through 
1996) or discharge (for years 1997 through 1999), and t denotes year of admission or 
discharge.  The vectors δ and λ include fixed effects for hospital and year, respectively.  
The key independent variables are indicators for whether the hospital previously has 
received a high-mortality flag (Highimt) or low-mortality flag (Lowimt).  Given lags in the 
release of the report cards, the flags assigned to hospitals in period t are typically based 
on performance data for year t-2 or t-3.  Each of these indicators is interacted with 
indicators for the number of months since a hospital received its first flag
4 (e.g., 1-12 
months, 13-24 months, 25-36 months, and more than 36 months) to estimate the 
persistence of any effects on volume.   5 
The first column of Table 1 shows the results of this regression.  Being identified 
as a high-mortality hospital is associated with a decline of approximately 4.9 bypass 
surgery patients per month during the twelve months following that designation.  This 
decline is significant at the 5 percent level.  The decline is reasonably large.  The average 
hospital performs about 50 bypass surgery operations per month, so the change in volume 
is about 10 percent.  While this negative impact on volume remains in the estimates 
beyond one year after the initial report, these effects are not significant at conventional 
levels.   
In contrast to their impact on low-quality hospitals, the reports do not seem to 
increase future volume for those facilities receiving low-mortality flags.  The estimated 
coefficient is positive in the first year following a report, and becomes negative in 
subsequent years.  It is always imprecisely estimated.  With only data from New York 
State, we cannot tell whether the patients moving out of low quality hospitals are not 
receiving surgery at all, or are simply being spread over all non-low quality hospitals.   
We can understand more about what is happening by considering the type of 
patients who are not receiving bypass surgery at high-mortality hospitals.  A reduction in 
relatively healthy patients is more indicative that patients (or their referring doctors) are 
choosing not to go to low quality providers.  A reduction in sicker patients, who often 
receive more immediate surgery would suggest that low quality hospitals are choosing to 
operate less frequently. 
The next two columns of Table 1 repeat our regressions separately for low- and 
high-severity subsamples of the patient population.
5  The decline in volume for hospitals 
receiving high-mortality flags is driven by reductions in the number of low-severity 6 
cases.  The number of such cases declines by roughly 15 percent and 10 percent relative 
to the sample average in the first and second years, respectively.  There is no change in 
the number of high-severity patients.  Thus, it appears that patients and referring 
cardiologists are choosing to reduce operations at low quality institutions. 
These volume effects notwithstanding, we recall that the stated goal of cardiac 
surgery reporting is to improve the quality of medical care.  To examine the impact of 
reporting on outcomes, we repeat these regressions using the risk-adjusted mortality rate 
as the dependent variable.  We form values of risk-adjusted mortality for each hospital-
month by dividing average observed mortality by average predicted mortality for a given 
hospital-month and multiplying that ratio by the statewide average mortality rate for the 
entire nine-year period.  To account for heterogeneity based on sample size and to 
mitigate the effect of small numbers of observations, we weight the observations by the 
total number of bypass surgery cases for a given hospital-year.   
The last column of Table 1 shows the results for mortality.  Identification as a 
high-mortality hospital is associated with improved future performance.  Hospitals that 
are publicly identified as being low quality experience a decline of 1.2 percentage points 
(significant at the 1 percent level) during the first 12 months after an initial report.  This 
decrease remains for the three years following the report, though the significance is only 
at the 10 percent level for months 13 through 24.  The average risk-adjusted mortality 
rate is 2.55 percent for the entire sample.  For those hospitals receiving a high-mortality 
flag, the average risk-adjusted mortality rate prior to receiving that flag is 3.82 percent.  
Relative to either of these baselines, the change we identify represents a significant 
improvement in performance. 7 
Those hospitals receiving a low-mortality flag show little evidence of mortality 
changes.  The coefficients are slightly positive, but only statistically significant in the 
third year after the report.   
 
Discussion 
The evidence from the first decade of New York’s bypass surgery reporting 
program suggests that the public release of quality information has had an impact on both 
the volume of cases and future quality at hospitals identified as poor performers.  With 
respect to procedural volume, low performing hospitals have lost relatively healthy 
patients to competing facilities.  This change may be the result of demand-side factors, 
such as the possibility that healthier patients are more able to search for higher quality 
providers, although several studies have suggested that similar reports have not been used 
by cardiologists (Schneider and Epstein, 1996) or managed care insurers (Mukamel et al., 
2000) in affecting referral or contracting patterns.   
Another possibility is supply-side factors within the affected hospitals are 
generating this result.  For example, surgeons at poorly performing hospitals may simply 
be choosing to do fewer procedures or may be encouraged to do fewer procedures by 
hospital administrators.  In the extreme, some surgeons may be exiting the market 
entirely.  To the extent that those surgeons leaving the market were previously doing 
relatively routine cases, this reduction might be concentrated among relatively healthy 
patients.  Regardless of the relative importance of demand- and supply-side factors in 
affecting procedural volumes, our results do suggest that the largest reductions for poor 
performing hospitals are among low- rather than high-severity patients.  Whatever efforts 8 
physicians may be making to reduce surgery to high-risk patient are not reducing their 
volumes of those patients in equilibrium. 
Our findings with respect to quality improvement might also be explained by 
multiple factors.  First, to the extent that hospitals flagged as poor performers lose 
surgical volume, they may work harder to replace that volume, particularly given the high 
marginal profitability associated with cardiac procedures.  Alternatively, hospitals and 
surgeons may make efforts to improve their future quality for reasons that are motivated 
not by financial concerns, but by concern for patient health and their reputations as 
providers of high quality medical care.  Stanley Dziuban et al. (1994) argue that this is 
why one hospital improved its performance after quality reporting. 
While New York’s experience with bypass surgery report cards has provided 
clear evidence of market changes associated with the public release of quality 
information, the exact mechanisms underlying these changes represents an area for future 
research.  Identifying such mechanisms will provide a better understanding of the impact 
of public quality reports on medical productivity. 
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Figure 1:  Distribution of Hospital-Level Risk-Adjusted Mortality Rates in New 
York, 1991-99 
Note: The risk-adjusted mortality rates in this figure are based on a single logistic regression using 
isolated CABG procedures in New York State for the period from 1991 through 1999.  See footnote 3 for a 
comparison of our procedure to that used in New York’s CABG report cards. 
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Table 1:  Regressions of CABG Cases and Risk-Adjusted Mortality on Publicly 
Reported Performance 
 
1-12 -4.9 ** -5.4 *** 0.6 -1.2 ***
(2.4) (2.0) (0.9) (0.4)
13-24 -3.1 -3.7 * 0.7 -1.3 *
(2.6) (2.1) (1.0) (0.7)
25-36 -3.7 -4.0 0.4 -1.3 ***
(3.7) (2.8) (1.4) (0.5)
More than 36 -7.1 -5.9 -1.2 -0.6
(4.9) (3.8) (1.5) (0.6)
1-12 3.0 1.5 1.5 0.2
(6.6) (4.5) (2.4) (0.3)
13-24 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 0.3
(6.8) (4.2) (3.1) (0.2)
25-36 -1.8 -1.9 0.0 0.3 **
(5.9) (4.1) (2.5) (0.2)
More than 36 -7.1 -3.2 -4.0 0.2
(8.8) (6.3) (2.8) (0.2)
Hospital Fixed Effects?
Year Fixed Effects?
Number of Observations
Adjusted R
2
Yes Yes Yes
Months Since Initial Low 
Mortality Flag
Yes Yes Yes
Average Value of 
Dependent Variable
Yes
Yes
All Patients
Low 
Severity
High 
Severity
Months Since Initial High 
Mortality Flag
Risk-Adjusted 
Mortality Rate
All Patients
CABG Cases
3,406 3,404 3,337 3,406
Note:  The level of observation is the hospital-month.  Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by hospital.  In regression with risk-adjusted 
mortality as the dependent variable, observations are weighted by the total number of 
cases for the relevant hospital-month.
*,**, and *** denote statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
47.49 2.55 35.63 12.13
0.073 0.706 0.838 0.86213 
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1  This issue is also debated.  William Ghali et al. (1997) find that the decline in mortality in New 
York from 1990 to 1992 was not significantly different from that in Massachusetts—which had 
not adopted a report card system as of 1992—over the same period.   
2 Dana Mukamel and Alvin Mushlin (1998) find that hospitals and surgeons with better reported 
outcomes experienced higher rates of growth in the market shares following the reports, though 
they do not consider how the outcomes for or severity of future patients seen by these providers is 
affected.  Stanley Dziuban et al. (1994) consider the impact of the New York report cards on one 
hospital that was cited as having significantly poorer than average outcomes.  This case study 
provides some insight into steps that one hospital took in response to the reports. 
3  One difference in our analysis is that we keep the set of covariates constant over time, while 
New York State varies them each year based on a stepwise regression procedure.  In our risk-
adjustment model, we include any covariate that: 1) was used in the New York models for all data 
from 1991 through 1999 and 2) was reliably collected for all nine years in our sample.  A detailed 
list of the covariates included in this regression is available from the authors upon request. 
4 While there is a small set of hospitals that received multiple high- or low-mortality flags during 
the nine-year period, we use only the first occurrence of either type of flag in determining when 
the high- or low-mortality indicator shifts from zero to one. 
5 We divide bypass surgery patients into low and high severity based on whether the predicted 
mortality determined by our patient-level, logistic regression is below or above the mean 
predicted mortality for the state of New York in a given year. 